Fate, Free Choice and Divine Providence

With the kind permission of Dr Ken Parry (Senior Research Fellow, Macquarie University), below is an extract from his chapter “Fate, Free Choice, and Divine Providence from the Neoplatonists to John Of Damascus” in The Cambridge Intellectual History of Byzantium, edited by Anthony Kaldellis , Niketas Siniossoglou (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 341–60.

The history of the concepts of fate (εἱμαρμένη / heimarmene), free choice (προαίρεσις / prohairesis), and divine providence (θεία πρόνοια / theia pronoia) between the fifth and the eighth centuries exemplifies the transition from late antiquity to the Middle Ages in intellectual terms. It was in this period that philosophy and theology developed durable models for the agency of divine providence and its concomitants, the problem of evil, free

choice, predestination, justice, necessity, and divine foreknowledge. Both Platonists and Christians devised theodicies to safeguard the sovereignty of providence in response to the presence of evil and injustice, and were at pains to demonstrate the fundamental goodness that infused the universe. This ultimate optimism was tempered at times by difficult life circumstances and pervasive uncertainty.

Such existential questions were not new, but they appear prominently in the period under discussion. Plotinos in the third century summed up the concern when he observed in his discussion of free choice that we may fear we are nothing when crushed by adverse events (Enneads 6.8.1). In the Latin west, works were composed in response to the barbarian invasions that defended divine providence against accusations of desertion and abandonment. One has only to think of Augustine’s The City of God (his treatise On Providence and the Problem of Evil was an earlier work) and Salvian’s On the Governance of God to see that the Christian worldview was in need of intellectual support. Thus began an apologetic tradition that took the blame for the loss of empire away from God and placed it on the shoulders of disobedient and sinful Christians. It was a theme that was to reemerge in the wake of the Arab invasions of the seventh century, in such works as the Apocalypse of pseudo-Methodios.

Before we delve into the texts that bridge the early and middle Byzantine periods, a survey of their antecedents is necessary. The question of divine providence was not fully explored by Plato himself, who contented himself with passing observations in the Laws (10: 902d–904c), Timaeus (30b–48a), and the myth of Er in the Republic (10: 613–620). Aristotle’s limited remarks were taken to imply that providence was not concerned with individuals and applied only to the celestial sphere (Metaphysics 12.7:1072b). His commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias, who wrote On Fate and On Providence (which survives in an Arabic translation and some Greek fragments), extended providence to include the sublunary realm, but limited it to species (On Fate 160). This position eventually proved unacceptable to Platonists and Christians alike. This is why Gregory of Nazianzos made his remark about Aristotle’s “mean” understanding of providence (Oration27.10). Philo of Alexandria composed a work On Providence, preserved in an Armenian translation, while among the Platonists Plutarch is said to have written On What Lies in Our Power: Against the Stoics, as well as On Fate, and Alcinous in his Handbook of Platonism makes a contribution to the debate. Plotinos in hisEnneads has two treatises on providence (Enn. 3. 2–3), one on free choice (Enn. 6.8), and another on evil (Enn. 1.8), while his disciple Porphyry composed a work On What Is in Our Power, which deals with the choice of reincarnated life. Questions relating to providence and free choice were also discussed in other ancient languages, in Latin by Cicero and Seneca, while in the second century the Syrian Christian Bardaisan wrote his Book of the Laws of the Countries, which deals with fate and free choice. Providence was discussed by early Christian writers in reaction to Gnostic dualism and astral fatalism, notably by Origen in his On First Principles. Among Christian authors of the fourth century, the Cappadocians discuss our topic, specifically Basil the Great in his homilies on the Hexaemeron(The Six Days of Creation), Gregory of Nazianzos in his Orations and poems, and Gregory of Nyssa in his On the Making of Man. Nemesios of Emesa has an extended discussion on several theories of providence in his On the Nature of Man.

The Platonist Hierokles of Alexandria composed a treatise On Providence, extracts from which are preserved by Photios (Bibliotheke codd. 214 and 251). He wrote it to console his friend the historian Olympiodoros on theloss of his adopted son. In it he develops the idea that fate accompanies providence but is subordinate to it, and he applies the notion of

“conditional fate” (a probable source being Alcinous) to reconcile fate and free choice. He speaks of two types of providence: the primary incorporeal and the secondary material, the first pertaining to the gods and the second to human beings and other rational beings. The latter incorporates chance (τύχη / tyche) and opportune moment (καιρός / kairos), and is associated with fate which is conditioned by what is merited from previous lives (Bibliotheke 251.20). He points to the limits of free choice by remarking that our will is not capable of changing everything simply by exercising freedom of choice. If this were so, it would result in a multiplicity of worlds because we do not all want the same things (251.26). Only certain things lie within our power, and as rational beings we are worthy of a different fate from irrational animals. For the latter, their demise is undetermined because there is no judgment regarding their present lives, whereas for us additional factors determine the time and manner of our end. The consequences of our choices, as well as what “apparently” happens by chance (τύχη / tyche), contribute to our fate and the judgment that awaits us, but ultimately all is corrected according to the laws of fate that the creator has ordained for us (251.31). For Hierokles divine judgment and free choice exist in an intricate net (πλέγμα / plegma) of interdependence that we need to discern in order to practice the virtue that brings its own reward in terms of shortening the cycle of rebirth (251.15–16).

On the Christian side, we have the work On Providence by Theodoret, bishop of Cyrrhus, which endorses the idea that God ordained the Incarnation from all eternity (10.44–57). Christ’s Incarnation was foreknown from the beginning and was not dependent upon the Fall; it was not atonement for sins, but the supreme example of providential care. Theodoret criticizes those who say that God does not concern himself with what exists, as well as those who say that he extends his providence only as far as the moon (1.10). His initial chapters focus on the argument from design to demonstrate the harmonious ordering of the universe and the human body as evidence for a providential creator (1–3). A central theme of the work is the justification of the political status quo by insisting that the rank of each person in society is providentially determined. Unlike Gregory of Nyssa, who wanted to abolish slavery (Homily on Ecclesiastes 4), Theodoret views the master–slave relationship as necessary for goodgovernance and social stability (7–8) (the Byzantine Church did not outlaw slave ownership by bishops and other clergy). He defends the dependency of the poor on the rich, and the symbiotic nature of their relationship, against those who see inequalities and injustices as evidence for a world bereft of divine concern (6), citing the example of Job, who remained steadfast in the face of unwarranted and inexplicable suffering.

The most important Platonist contribution to our topic in the fifth century was that of Proklos in the three works discussed below, but he also touches on it in other works, such as the Elements of Theology (Prop. 120–122). The three works are the so-called tria opuscula, and they tackle several of the issues that dominate Platonist discussions of providence

and evil. Space allows us only to summarize their arguments. In Ten Problems Concerning Providence, Proklos begins by noting that the problems associated with providence have been subject to a great deal ofscrutiny, but that it is important to look at them again in order to refute those who do not believe in it. The problems concern how providence knows contingent things, how things participate in providence, theexistence of evil (treated more extensively in On the Existence of Evils; see below), human inequalities, the animal kingdom, rewards and punishments, and inherited guilt. The notion of “inherited guilt” or “ancestral fault” (προγονικὸν ἁμάρτημα / progonikon hamartema) concerns the wrongdoings of ancestors passed on to their descendants as a result of metempsychosis. Gregory of Nyssa had discussed two theories of transmigration: that human souls migrate into plants and animals and that human souls migrate only into human bodies (On the Soul and the Resurrection 8). The latter position was that embraced by Proklos (Ten Problems 60).

Let us take the question of providence in relation to animals. Proklos proposes that in general animals are ruled by fate, but to some extent also by providence because they have a vestige of rationality and therefore a degree of self-determination. If this is the case, then it suggests that the principle of merit (reward and punishment) applies to them and that they should be treated with justice (Ten Problems 7). Proklos is here entering into the debate within the Platonist tradition regarding justice toward animals that Plutarch and Porphyry (On Abstinence) had discussed. According to his biographer Marinos, Proklos is said to have abstained from animal food and merely tasted it for the sake of piety (Life of Proklos 9), and we know from Porphyry that Plotinos avoided animal products (Life of Plotinos 2). For Basil the Great, the prelapsarian diet was vegetarian (First Homily on Fasting 5) and this was to become the norm in Byzantine monasteries. However, Christian vegetarianism was based not on a theory of justice toward animals but on ascetic denial and discipline. Proklos’ treatise On Providence responds in the form of a letter to Theodore the engineer’s arguments in favour of determinism. At one point Proklos argues ad hominen that because Theodore equates the universe with a mechanical clock he sees the maker of the universe (δημιουργός / demiourgos) as a kind of engineer like himself. He provides the classical Platonist response to the question “what depends on us?” (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν / eph’ hemin), by stating that what depends on us is what belongs to our faculty of choice, not to divine action. He distinguishes what pertains to choice and what to will, with the will only regarding the good, whereas choice is concerned with good and evil (Prov. 2.7.57). He further maintains that our lives are a mixture of what does and what does not depend on us, and that those who follow virtue have more that depends on them, while those who follow worldly pursuits have less. The first are free but the second are slaves to necessity (Prov. 2.7.61). For Proklos, true freedom is a divine gift that comes from knowing what lies in our power and what does not. It is in this context that he discusses the efficacy of prayer and theurgy, as well as divination, the art of predicting the future through auguries, astrological predictions, and horoscopes, which he says is well attested in many Greek and non-Greek sources (Prov. 2.37–39). In the sixth century, the historian Agathias refers to astrological predictions of inauspicious cycles that provide a deterministic explanation for contemporary wars, political conflicts, and plagues (Histories 5.10.5).

In the third treatise On the Existence of Evils, Proklos poses a dilemma: if providence is the cause of everything then evil cannot exist, but if it does exist then providence is not the cause of everything. He resolves this dilemma by stating that although evil is part of the providential order it is not caused by it. The gods and providence are absolved from responsibility for the evils that happen in our world (Evils 58). Proklos rejects the Plotinian proposition that identifies evil with matter (Enn. 1.8.14) by raising the question that, if matter is formless and without quality, how then can it be the cause of anything, let alone evil? Evil is relative, not absolute; it cannot exist independently of the good, and is therefore mixed with the good. Lacking an efficient cause, it is in fact a by-product, or παρυπόστασις (parhypostasis) in Proklos’ language. The term was adopted by Dionysios the Areopagite who was followed in this by Maximos the Confessor and John of Damascus. Proklos is here applying the Aristotelian causal distinction between what happens per se and what happens per accidens (Metaph. 5.2:1013b–1014a), with the latter being contingent upon the former.

Evil may be a privation and coexistent of good but it still happens within the control of the gods, otherwise Proklos would have to posit two independent principles, one good and one bad, resulting in a dualism that would undermine his monadic credentials (i.e. his belief in a single source). He has to be careful not to turn evil into an autonomous principle on the one hand, or implicate the gods in it on the other. Unlike the Judeo-Christian tradition, Proklos does not have a personified fallen angel like Satan on which to pin it, and there are no intermediary daemons to carry this burden. The daemons maintain the perfection of their rank and are“malicious” only insofar as the gods allow them to be for our betterment (Evils 18). Besides, for Proklos there is no one cause of evil but many, because as a parhypostasis evil is dependent on many factors (Evils 47.2–4),even though ultimately it is mixed with the good. He clearly states that everything is for the sake of the good, even evil itself, but although all things are for the sake of the good, divinity is not the cause of evil. When hesays that the gods produce evil qua good (Evils 61.5–18), this suggests that suffering and injustice will have more meaning for us if we see it from the perspective of eternity, rather than sub specie humanitatis.

The gods may have foreknowledge of contingent events, but those who benefit from the providence they confer do so according to their capacity to receive it. This is because the nature of divinity by definition cannot take a relational (personal) interest in earthly persons and events (Elements of Theology, Prop. 122), yet at the same time neither is plurality nor individuality negated by providential care. How then does prayer function forthe Platonist? Origen was one of the earliest Christian writers to explore the relation of providence to prayer in his treatise On Prayer, as well as in connection with the “idle argument” (ἀργὸς λόγος / argos logos) for fatalism (Against Kelsos 2.20). For Hierokles, prayer is a gift of providence itself, thus it is necessary to practice it in order to live in conformity with the

divine. Furthermore, what lies in our power implies providence while equally providence implies what lies in our power (Bibliotheke 251.25). This reciprocity is endorsed by Proklos (Prov. 37) when he says that the gods know what depends on us in a divine and timeless manner, but this does not prevent us from acting in accordance with our nature. Whatever we decide is foreknown by them, because it is determined not by us but by them (Prov. 65.11–14). In associating providence with the gods Proklos etymologizes that pronoia derives from pro noia, meaning before intelligence or intellection (Prov. 1.1.7). As he says in the Elements of Theology, providence by its very name suggests an activity prior to intellect

(Prop. 120).